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Regional clusters are spatial agglomerations of firms operating in the same or connected 
industries, which enable innovation and economic performance for firms. A wealth of 
empirical literature shows that one of key elements of the success of regional clusters is that 
they facilitate the formation of local inter-organizational networks, which act as conduits of 
knowledge and innovation. While most studies focus on the benefits and characteristics of 
regional cluster networks and focus on advanced economies and ‘hot spots’, this paper 
advances with the existing literature by analyzing network dynamics and taking an 
emerging economy’s perspective. Using longitudinal data of a wine cluster in Chile and 
stochastic actor-oriented models for network dynamics, this paper examines what micro-
level drivers influence the formation of new knowledge ties among wineries. It finds that 
cohesion effects (reciprocity and transitivity) as well as firm-level heterogeneity in the 
knowledge bases influence the evolution of the knowledge network. Next, it explores how 
these micro-level network drivers influence the macro-level structural evolution of the local 
knowledge network. Empirical results have interesting implications for the cluster 
competitiveness and network studies literatures and the burgeoning literature on corporate 







1. Introduction  
It is generally acknowledged that regional clusters enable superior innovation and economic 
performance for firms. This was first documented by Alfred Marshall (1920) writing about 
industrial districts, and supporting evidence was accumulated throughout most of the past 
and present centuries (among many others: Allen, 1983; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Aydalot and 
Keeble, 1988; Pyke et al., 1990; Becattini, 1991; Krugman, 1991; Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996; Storper, 1997; Scott, 1998; Lawson and Lorenz, 1999; Baptista, 2000; Cooke, 2001; 
Capello and Faggian, 2005). For organization and management scholars, the most 
influential contributions raising consciousness about the importance of location for firm 
competitiveness are probably Saxenian’s (1994) book on Silicon Valley, and Michael Porter’s 
(1990, 1998) works on clusters and competitiveness. Interest in regional clusters is evident 
in the conceptual models aimed at understanding cluster governance (Bell et al., 2009; 
Arikan, 2009) and the factors shaping their evolution (Pouder and St. John, 1996; Romanelli 
and Khessina, 2005; Mesquita, 2007).  
In spite of this long-standing and vast literature, debate about what is so special about 
regional clusters is still open. A central tenet of contemporary studies on regional clusters is 
that geography per se does not guarantee firm success (see e.g. Boschma, 2005; Tallman and 
Phene, 2007) and that it is the social networks that are generated across cluster 
organizations that explain at least part of their innovativeness (Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2004; Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2005; Singh, 2005). As Gittleman (2007) and Giuliani (2007) 
suggest, the benefits of spatial proximity for innovation do not spring from unplanned, 
random interactions – the Marshallian metaphor of “knowledge in the air” - but rather are 
based on purposeful and selective social and professional contacts and informal 
communications among employees within local social networks that enhance innovative 
performance. A recent study by Whittington et al. (2009, p. 117) on the US biotechnology 
industry confirms this, showing that “both geographic and relational conceptions of location 
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matter for innovation, but…., networks are primary” (emphasis added). Networks act as 
channels of knowledge, which can be used and recombined at firm level to generate 
innovative processes and products.  
Firms in regional clusters use diverse type of networks to access knowledge from local and 
distant actors. Distant ties are important to increase the variety of knowledge sources for 
the local context and to avoid the cluster formation from becoming a technology trap. Local 
ties, which are the focus of this paper, bring other benefits. First, they are typically high 
value in terms of the quality of the knowledge they channel, which is often rich, fine-grained 
and tacit – i.e. “capable of transmitting subtle cues” (Bell and Zaheer, 2007, p. 957). The 
richness derives from the geographical proximity of managers and workers who are able to 
meet face to face to discuss problems. Ambiguous and uncertain problems are more easily 
resolved through direct observation and confrontation. Second, workers operating in similar 
environments are likely to encounter context-specific problems and are more able to 
develop the expertise required to resolve them. The recombination of local skills and 
knowledge through social networking enables unique solutions, which in many cases are at 
the basis of firms’ product differentiation and innovation strategies. Thus, the 
embeddedness of firms in local social networks is considered crucial for their upgrading and 
innovativeness (Bell, 2005; Gittleman, 2007; McDermott et al., 2009; Perez-Aleman, 2010).  
Notwithstanding the widespread consensus about the importance of networks for 
promoting innovation in regional clusters, research in this area suffers from two limitations. 
First, most studies focus on the benefits and characteristics of regional cluster networks but 
seldom analyze their dynamics. A conventional understanding is that networks in regional 
clusters are dense and form through frequent interactions among co-located entrepreneurs 
and firm employees (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Narratives 
about the social interactions in clusters suggest that they are spontaneous and occur 
through chance encounters at local bars or Sunday soccer events (Saxenian, 1994; 
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Malmberg, 2003). Although this may be true of social relations in general, using network 
analysis, recent works show that knowledge networks in regional clusters are not randomly 
structured. Rather they have informal hierarchical structures (Giuliani, 2007; Ter Wal, 
2010), likely driven by several underlying micro-level forces. While an understanding of the 
dynamics of networks is an indication of cluster aims and success, little is known about 
these micro-level forces.  
The second limitation is that research so far is focused almost entirely on advanced 
economies and high tech ‘hot spots’ (Pouder and St John, 1996); it is only recently that 
management and organization scholars have begun to focus on regional clusters in 
emerging/developing economies (Mesquita and Lazzarini, 2008; McDermott et al., 2009; 
Perez-Aleman, 2010).1 Also, a disproportionate number of network studies of regional 
clusters relate to the US biotech industry (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Casper, 2007; 
Gittleman, 2007; Tallman and Phene, 2007; Whittington et al., 2009) and other high tech 
advanced country clusters (Ter Wal, 2010; Bell and Zaheer, 2007; Fleming and Frenken, 
2007), and use co-patenting to track knowledge flows and social networks (e.g. Singh, 2005; 
Gittleman, 2007). However, as emerging economies are becoming dominant players in 
international competition, studies focused on such contexts are crucial for informing theory 
and management practice (Hoskisson et al., 2000). The conditions normally taken for 
granted in studies focusing on advanced countries may not hold for emerging/developing 
economies (Perez-Aleman, 2010). One important difference is that in developing and 
emerging economies the presence of firms with accumulated skills and capabilities cannot be 
assumed: firms that have caught up with the technological frontier to become world-class 
producers (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Bhattacharya and Michael, 2008) may co-exist with 
firms where intra-firm accumulation of capabilities does not occur at all (Bell and Pavitt, 
1993; Cimoli et al., 2009; Perez-Aleman, 2010). In these contexts, the process of learning 
and accumulation of technological capabilities is often hampered by macroeconomic 
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instability, lack of business confidence, weak state capacity and poor institutions (Arza, 
2005), which leave many firms at the margins of domestic and global competition.  
This paper addresses these limitations by studying the evolution of the inter-organizational 
knowledge network of a wine cluster in an emerging country, Chile. In this context, 
knowledge networks are built on the seeking and provision of informal advice by the 
enologists and agronomists employed by the wineries in a cluster. They capture the 
knowledge flows among the wine producing firms that compete in the market. The 
hypothesis is that the evolution of a knowledge network is determined by the co-occurrence 
of three sets of micro-level effects. Cohesion effects, which assume that knowledge network 
growth is characterized by greater cohesion and network closure among firms – a view that 
coincides with many cluster narratives but which has not been tested empirically. Status 
effects, which suggest that more prominent firms in terms of their links, tend to reinforce 
this prominence through the formation of more ties over time, especially relevant in the 
resource-poor and uncertain contexts that frequently characterize developing/emerging 
countries. The third effect is the capability effect, which refers to how heterogeneity in firm-
level knowledge bases influences the formation of new knowledge ties. These three effects 
are driven by different and sometimes contrasting underlying motivations, which 
nevertheless can co-exist in clusters. The impact of each of these effects on network 
dynamics may differ. Cohesion is bound to lead to more egalitarian and dense networks, 
while status and capability effects are likely to promote fragmentation and hierarchy within 
the network structure (Gould, 2002; Giuliani, 2007). This paper seeks to answer the 
following questions: What are the micro-level effects leading to the evolution of knowledge 
networks in regional clusters? How do micro-level effects shape the macro-level structural 
characteristics of networks?    
We analyze a wine cluster, Valle de Colchagua (CV), in one of the most thriving wine areas 
in Chile (Schachner, 2002, 2005). Data were collected through face-to-face interviews 
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conducted by the author. The survey was based on the same structured questionnaire, 
administered to the population of wineries (32 firms) in the cluster in 2002 and again in 
2006 - a period of cluster expansion. Social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) 
is employed to conduct static comparisons between knowledge networks over time, and 
cohesion, status and capability effects are tested using a class of stochastic actor-based models 
of network dynamics, based on Stocnet SIENA as a tool for analysis (Snijders, 2001, 2005).  
The empirical results show that there are two main micro-level effects guiding the network 
dynamics in CV. Cohesion effects promote greater density in the cluster knowledge network 
by reinforcing the core of innovating firms. Capability effects keep firms with weak 
knowledge bases on the periphery of the knowledge network. This paper provides a new 
interpretation of cluster network dynamics, in which networks do not simply become more 
egalitarian or denser over time due to endogenous network dynamics, often seen as a 
natural consequence of co-location. We show that the knowledge network supports an 
informal hierarchy which is based on the existence of significant differences in the 
knowledge bases in the cluster, with some firms being particularly resource-poor and 
displaying poor socialization dynamics. This result is novel and has important implications 
for the cluster competitiveness and network studies literatures and the burgeoning 
literature on corporate behaviour in emerging economies (see Section 6 Discussion).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the Chilean wine industry context and 
describes the CV cluster and its inter-organizational knowledge network. The research 
hypotheses are presented in Section 3, and Section 4 describes the methodology for data 
collections and analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical results, which are discussed in 





 2. Research Context: a Chilean wine cluster  
 
2.1 Export-led growth in Chile and the importance of natural resource-based 
industries 
 
Chile is a small country but is one of the most thriving economies in Latin America. Based 
on exports from natural-resource based industries, e.g. mining, agroindustry and fishing, 
since 1990 Chile has enjoyed sustained economic growth, a doubling of per capita income 
and a reduction in absolute poverty,  although income inequality remains high (Perez-
Aleman, 2005; Infante and Sunke, 2009).  
One sector that has achieved stunning export value growth is the wine industry. Wine 
production has a long tradition dating back to the Spanish-Mexican Jesuits who came to 
Latin America in the 19th century (Del Pozo, 1998); however, it is only since 1990 that the 
industry has boomed in line with increased international demand for wine (Giuliani et al., 
2010). The spectacular performance of Chile’s wine industry is evidenced in the export 
statistics: in 1994 Chile accounted for only 1.73 percent of total wine exports, by 2004 its 
share was 4.6 percent (a 266% increase). In the same period, instead, traditional wine 
producing countries, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and France, lost market share and 
experienced a reduction of export values as a percentage of world wine exports (on average 
-17%). In 2007 Chile was ranked 4th for wine export volume (1,157,808 tonnes) (after the 
traditional wine producing countries of Italy, France and Spain) and wine export value 
($US2,414,119,000) (after France, Italy and Australia).  
 
2.2 The CV cluster  
 
Export-oriented growth in the O’Higgins’ region where the CV is located, has been 
impressive. This region is about 200 km south of Santiago, the capital of Chile. Between 
1990 and 2005, agricultural and agro-industrial activities, such as wine production, saw the 
value of their exports rise from US$ 3m to US$161m (Ramirez and Silva Lira, 2008). The 
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CV has been responsible for much of this increase and is one of the most thriving and 
successful wine areas in the country (Schachner, 2002, 2005). The cluster is densely 
populated by wine producers and grape growers; other firms in the upstream and 
downstream wine production value chain are located outside the cluster territory, close to 
Santiago and other major urban areas, or abroad. As a result, the vertical division of labour 
within the cluster is fairly shallow. The CV cluster also includes a business association, 
aimed primarily at promoting the wines and marketing them locally, but with no specific 
mandate to foster innovation or facilitate dissemination of technical knowledge.  
At the time of the first survey (2002), the CV wine industry was beginning to taste success 
following ten years of steadily increasing investment.2 New modern wineries had been 
established and there was a general feeling that CV was set to become one of the leading 
wine areas in Chile. Despite the problems inherent in rural Chile (especially inadequate 
infrastructure), private investors, mostly powerful Chilean families, were making major 
efforts, sometimes jointly with public institutions (e.g. CORFO)3 to renovate and modernize 
the industry and catch up to the technological frontier. Already in 2002, some Colchagua 
wineries were as modern as the wineries in advanced countries, and many firms were using 
advanced technologies, employing skilled knowledge workers (oenologists and 
agronomists) and undertaking substantial experimentation in their vineyards and cellars. 
This was reflected in the wines which increasingly were being cited and rated in 
international specialized wine journals, such as Wine Spectator, Decanter, Wine Enthusiast, 
etc.4 Nevertheless, a considerable number of the firms in the cluster were technological 
laggards in 2002. 
By 2006 the situation had changed dramatically. The most visible change was the 
improvement to the local infrastructure including new paved roads and a training institute 
for local students to specialize in wine production, and plans for a research laboratory and a 
technology transfer office allied to the University of Talca. The cluster was promoting a set 
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of marketing initiatives ranging from strengthening the wine route to setting up new 
ventures connected to the flourishing local economy (promotion of local artisans, fairs, 
restaurants, etc.) These changes were paralleled by a continuous commitment of the 
wineries to match international wine quality standards. In 2005 Colchagua was awarded 
“Wine Region of the Year” by Wine Enthusiast, and in 2007, Wine Spectator’s Top 100 wines 
included two Colchaguan wines.  
This case is a particularly appropriate context for this study. First, it is a successful case 
from the developing world, where some firms have managed to compete at the international 
frontier and achieve quality standards that challenge leading wine producers such as France, 
Italy and the US. Second, it is dynamic. The impressive improvements in production 
quantity and quality are based on the efforts of firms to learn and innovate, and are giving 
rise to a dynamic inter-organizational knowledge network at the local level. Third, in the 
period considered in this study the cluster was experiencing a growth phase, which was 
neither disturbed by external macroeconomic or market shocks nor subjected to policy 
interventions to alter the structure of the local inter-organizational network. It is thus an 
ideal setting for exploring the emergence of spontaneous micro-level mechanisms of 
network dynamics.  
 
2.3 The inter-organizational knowledge network in CV 
Local knowledge networks typically are built through the interactions of technical 
professionals, in this case the agronomists and enologists and other technicians employed by 
the wineries in the cluster, who seek advice on technical problems that cannot be solved in 
house – which is consistent with other industry accounts (e.g. von Hippel, 1987; Saxenian, 
1994). For example, advice may be sought about how to treat a pest infestation or how to 
deal with high acidity levels during wine fermentation. These networks become established 
when the wineries are committed to improving their products via incremental innovation 
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based on the solutions to technical problems, reached through the advice of professionals 
working in other wineries.  
Inter-organizational networks have some important properties. They are built initially 
through the informal interactions among individuals (agronomists, enologists, technicians), 
who are the gatekeepers of the firm’s technical knowledge and how apply the knowledge 
acquired from other firms to their organizational routines. This is consistent with the 
industrial cluster literature, which describes linkages among firms as often poorly 
formalized through contracts and based mainly on workers’ and managers’ personal 
connections. Inkpen and Tsang (2005, p. 153) argue that “ connectivity between network 
members in an industrial district is usually established through informal interpersonal 
relations”. Such networks operate in a similar way to communities of practice in other 
contexts (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Wenger and Snyder, 2000). Agronomists and 
enologists transfer and receive technical advice from professionals in rival firms in the 
cluster such that the network operates as a community in which knowledge exchange is not 
controlled by firm owners who might be worried about knowledge leakage (Powell and 
Grodal, 2005). Also, the interviews conducted during the pilot and main fieldwork 
demonstrate that inter-organizational knowledge networks are not explicit and formalized 
endeavors to increase and promote ‘cluster-brand’ reputation. In other words, the formation 
of knowledge linkages is not the result of a planned and organized cooperation strategy, but 
is an informal and spontaneous networking process.  
 
3. Theory and Hypotheses  
Network studies tend to suggest that the evolution of the macro structural characteristics of 
a network is driven by concurrent forces operating at the micro level (Owen-Smith and 
Powell, 2004; Powell at al. 2005). Some are endogenously induced by the existing network – 
e.g. past relationships influence future ones (Walker et al., 1997; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) 
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and firms occupying similar structural positions in a network are likely to be connected in 
the future (Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008) - while others are exogenously-driven, which 
means that they are related to the heterogeneity in the internal and individual 
characteristics of the actors in the network. For instance, in a study on inter-firm alliances, 
similarity in firms’ technological and market specializations was found to influence future 
collaborations (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999), while diversity, rather than similarity has been 
shown to drive repeated formation of ties in the US biotech industry (Powell et al., 2005). 
Therefore, to investigate the dynamics of a network, it is important to explore the mix of 
exogenous and endogenous network effects that drive its evolution and how these effects 
shape its macro-structural characteristics (Di Maggio, 1992).  
In the context of industrial clusters one of the endogenous network effects is cohesion. This 
is described in numerous cluster narratives that report inter-organizational ties as being 
characterized by reciprocity, and highlight that geographical proximity enables close knit 
social relations among the firms in the cluster (Aydalot and Keeble, 1988; Pyke et al., 1990; 
Saxenian, 1994). No empirical test of whether cohesion influences the network dynamics in 
regional clusters has been conducted. However, it would be plausible that, in the absence of 
any other effect, cohesion would produce increasingly egalitarian, dense and all-
encompassing networks that discourage the formation of hierarchical structures 
(Granovetter, 1973). Other studies in the field of economic geography have sparked 
thinking about a different view of the network dynamics in clusters. It has been shown that 
even successful ‘hot spot’ regions may be spaces where informal relations are fragmented 
and structured very hierarchically (e.g. Ter Wal, 2010). This points to the need to study the 
other effects that may underpin network dynamics alongside cohesion. We think that two 
types of effects are important. One is status, which network scholars consider to be a 
powerful source of asymmetric relationships and hierarchical network structures (Gould, 
2002). The second relates to differences in firms’ characteristics in terms of abilities to 
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orchestrate and contribute to the local knowledge network. This paper considers differences 
in firms’ capabilities and knowledge bases as pivotal in shaping network relations (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990).  
In order to test the simultaneous roles of cohesion, status and capability effects in network 
dynamics, an inter-disciplinary conceptual framework is proposed, drawing on (a) 
organizational sociology and network theories (e.g. Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Powell et al., 
2005); (b) economic geography (e.g. Amin and Thrift, 1994; Aydalot and Keeble, 1988; 
Storper, 1997); and (c) evolutionary theories of firm’s learning and innovation (e.g. Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Dosi and Nelson, 2010).  
 
3.1 Cohesion effects  
Cohesion occurs when firms are connected by stable, closed and dense social structures. I 
consider that cohesion within a network can be increased by reciprocity, and by transitive 
closure. In the context of this paper, reciprocity emerges when a firm that has been the 
recipient of technical advice from another firm, decides to return (reciprocate) the favour. 
While reciprocity is common in human behavior (Gouldner, 1960), its motivations and 
drivers have been studied as mechanisms promoting the formation of new ties in inter-
corporate networks (Lincoln et al., 1992; Fehr and Gachter, 2000), with reciprocal ties 
found often to occur in the case of rival firms (von Hippel, 1987). If the firm decides to 
behave opportunistically, it will not reciprocate the advice received. Opportunistic 
behaviour occurs when the firm does not want to dissipate its proprietary knowledge by 
transferring pieces of knowledge that may increase the competitiveness of other firms.   
In the context of industry clusters, instances of opportunistic behavior are usually minimal 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994). Smith-Doerr and Powell (2005, p. 20) argue that, in industrial 
districts, “repetitive contracting, embedded in local social relationships, encourages 
reciprocity. Monitoring is facilitated by social ties and constant contact.” Likewise, Grabher 
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(1994, p. 181) describes East German regional industry in the 1970s as characterized by the 
emergence of informal networks, which “provided diffuse infrastructure for barter governed 
by the principle of reciprocity.” In such contexts, reciprocity is guided by two underlying 
motivations. The first is that reciprocal relationships are beneficial because they stabilize 
relationships and increase levels of trust between the parties, which in turn minimizes 
transaction costs. The second is that, within a spatially bound area, instances of 
opportunistic behavior are quickly broadcast. A bad reputation in relation to opportunism 
will sever existing ties and discourage formation of new ties with other firms. Hence, over 
time, reciprocation should become a safe strategy for firms keen to take advantage of the 
pool of local knowledge. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1 (HP 1) In regional clusters, the search for reciprocity leads to the 
formation of new knowledge linkages among firms.  
 
Transitive closure also encourages network growth and increases cohesiveness. It occurs 
when a new link is formed between two actors that are already connected to a common 
third actor. Underpinning transitive closure is what is known in social psychology as 
“balance theory” (Heider, 1958), which suggests that an individual establishes a new linkage 
with a third one on the basis of whether, the individuals she/he is already connected to, 
have positive feelings about (and are themselves connected to) this third person. Basically, 
the idea is that an individual perceives a sort of psychological pressure from her/his direct 
contacts (e.g. friends) and is induced to choose new contacts in a way that preserves some 
consistency and harmony (or balance) within the social group that she/he is part of 
(Granovetter, 1973).  
Studies on regional clusters generally do not refer to the concept of transitive closure, but 
include many stories that are persuasive about the existence and importance of  network 
closure and are indicative of the tendency for firms to become embedded in dense networks 
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(Becattini et al., 1991). These ideas are not too dissimilar to the tradition in studies of 
economic geography of “untraded interdependencies” (Storper, 1997), “innovative milieux” 
(Aydalot and Keeble, 1988; Camagni, 1991) and “collective learning” (Capello and Faggian, 
2005). For instance, Inkpen and Tsang, (2005, p. 153; emphasis added) consider that “a 
characteristics of an industrial district is dense, non hierarchical networks of firms located 
within the district, with some of them forming cliques.” Likewise, Scott (1988, p. 31; 
emphasis added) defines industrial localities as “agglomerations [of producers] that coalesce 
out of the dense networks of transactional interrelations that form as the social division of 
labour deepens and as particular groups of producers are brought into intense and many-
sided interaction with one another.”  
One of the main reasons for firms to form triads, is that they represent social spaces where 
relationships can be monitored easily, which guards against opportunistic behavior and is 
likely to give rise to intense exchanges of valuable, tacit and fine-grained knowledge (Uzzi, 
1997). In other words, they are spaces where the local “mysteries of trade become no 
mysteries” (Marshall, 1920, p. 271) and where knowledge is used and improved. In regional 
clusters the formation of triads may be facilitated by geographical proximity which provides 
previously unconnected professionals with numerous opportunities to get to know each 
other, e.g. at local social events, and to “close” the triplet. Additionally, when firms are 
operating in close proximity, their professional staff can seek out relationships that reduce 
antagonisms and promote a better working environment, thus seeking ‘balanced’ 
relationships. This leads to the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 2 (HP 2): In regional clusters, the search for transitive closure leads to 





3.2 Status effects 
While cohesion effects strengthen the connections among firms already in direct or indirect 
contact, status acts as a signal for firms with no prior contacts in the network and little 
knowledge about where to seek advice. Status is defined here as the perceived quality of an 
actor; prominent status signals reputation within the community (Podolny, 1993). Ibarra 
and Andrews (1993) and Lazega et al. (2010) among others, suggest that, under conditions 
of uncertainty and ambiguity, the search of advice is socially-derived. This means that the 
most centrally positioned actors in a network are those that most rapidly gain reputation 
because of the information about them that diffuses through their many direct linkages. The 
most prominent actors are frequently cited, which contributes to their aura. In addition to 
reducing uncertainty, selection of a prominent actor may be preferred to selection based on 
quality judgments because the latter “are costly to make” (Gould, 2002, p. 1149).5 Key to the 
status effect is whether the existence of a prominent firm shapes the evolution of the 
knowledge network in a regional cluster over time. There are two ways that this may occur: 
preferential attachment (de Solla Price, 1976; Barabasi and Albert, 1999) and assortativity 
(Newman, 2002).  
Preferential attachment is based on the idea that firms guided by status when searching for 
technical advice, will target prominent firms. This behavior is common among new entrants 
with no prior knowledge of the other firms in their competitive environment (e.g. 
Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008), but can be associated also with incumbent firms in a regional 
cluster. In particular, while it is true that “proximity makes information about local 
competitors more available because managers are better able to scan the activities of local 
competitors compared to the activities of outside competitors”(Pouder and St. John, 1996, p. 
1996), the extent to which this information is easily accessible to all cluster firms is 
debatable. Firms that are particularly resource-poor may be able neither to collect reliable 
information about the quality of the other firms, nor to judge their value. In a survival or 
 16 
rural cluster in a developing country, for example, many firms’ observational scope may be 
limited by the routine of day-by-day activities and time, and the flexibility required to 
search and accumulate valid information about other firms may be limited. In other cases, 
the number of cluster firms may mean that scanning the quality of all potential sources of 
advice is too time-consuming. For these reasons, status may be a valid and time-saving 
criterion to decide which firms to approach for advice. This leads to the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3 (HP 3) In regional clusters, firms with a prominent status are likely 
to form more linkages over time.  
  
The second status effect is assortativity, which refers to the preference of an actor to attach 
itself to others with similar status (Newman, 2002). This adds to the preferential attachment 
effect, and it proposes that cluster firms with high status may achieve satisfaction from 
interacting with firms with similarly good reputations. Also, while preferential attachment 
is likely to be asymmetrical - the prominent firm transfers some knowledge to lower status 
firms, but not vice versa (Gould, 2002) – assortativity is more balanced way because both 
parties have something to gain. The connection is established both to enable sharing of 
resources and also to create a local self-reinforcing elite of reputable firms. These coalitions 
of firms may constitute a valid strategy for pooling reputation and building or 
strengthening regional identity (Romanelli and Khessina, 2005), especially in clusters that 
have not achieved complete international visibility. This leads to hypothesis 4:   
Hypothesis 4 (HP 4) In regional clusters, firms tend to form new linkages with 





3.3 Capability effects  
Endogenous network effects – cohesion and status – are important but on their own do not 
acknowledge the significant organizational variation among co-localized firms (Baum and 
Mezias, 1992). It is proposed that the formation of new knowledge linkages may be 
influenced by both endogenous network effects and the fact that firms differ in one 
important dimension, their knowledge base, which is critical for the establishment of 
knowledge linkages (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Firms vary widely in their patterns of 
learning and knowledge creation. Their knowledge bases are built through a process of 
cumulative learning, which is inherently imperfect, complex and path-dependent (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Arthur, 1988; Dosi, 1988), characteristics that result in persistent 
differences among firms. These differences are likely to be even more profound in 
emerging/developing country firms, many of which are behind the technology frontier 
(Perez-Aleman, 2010). Also, a tradition of studies on firm-level learning in developing 
countries suggests that firms in such context may remain technological laggards over 
decades, as the accumulation of capabilities through training and knowledge generation 
efforts require dedication and commitment and does not occur overnight (Bell and Pavitt, 
1993).  
Studies of regional clusters focusing on advanced countries tend to ignore this aspect. 
Studies that do take account of differences among firms’ knowledge bases usually focus on 
qualitative differences, essentially the presence/absence of technological overlaps in areas of 
specialization (Cantner and Graf, 2006; Tallman and Phene, 2007). The approach proposed 
here considers the quantitative differences in firms’ knowledge bases: some are more advanced 
than others in terms of the quality and experience of their professional technical workers, 
and some are more intensively involved in knowledge-creating activities. This paper 
suggests two ways in which heterogeneity in the strength of knowledge bases influences the 
formation of new knowledge linkages: through similarity and threshold effects.  
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The similarity effect implies that firms predominantly prefer to establish knowledge 
linkages with other firms at the same level of technical or knowledge advancement. This is 
because both parties can take advantage of a pool of knowledge that is similarly 
sophisticated, which will facilitate interactive learning. If knowledge bases are too 
dissimilar, linkages will be less likely. When knowledge bases are very different, firms will 
have  different problems and will be less likely to be able to help each other. Thus similarity 
in knowledge bases influences the formation of future knowledge ties.  
Hypothesis 5 (HP 5): In regional clusters, firms with similar strengths in terms of 
their knowledge bases are more likely to form new knowledge linkages than firms 
with dissimilar knowledge bases.  
 
The threshold effect is a mechanism that is seldom considered in explanations of the 
formation or not of new ties. It refers to new linkages that are formed only if the parties 
have some valuable characteristics that are over a certain threshold level (e.g. status, power, 
wealth, skills, etc.). Actors with below-the-threshold characteristics are less likely to form 
linkages. Masuda and Konno (2006) consider the threshold effect to be a determinant of the 
formation of elite groups, where hierarchy decides about new entrants based on their 
characteristics. We would emphasize that in given contexts, individuals with characteristics 
below a certain given threshold do not establish linkages with those whose characteristics 
position them above the threshold or those with similar sub-threshold characteristics. An 
example is homeless people, who have similarly fragile and precarious conditions, but 
seldom interact with each other (Rokach, 2004; Hersberger, 2007). It applies also to people 
with psychological disorders or low levels of education (McPherson et al., 2006).  
One reason why the threshold effect is generally not considered in studies of network 
dynamics in  regional clusters is because most focus on resource-rich actors (e.g. inventors, 
innovative firms) as their unit of analysis. However, there is significant anecdotal evidence 
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of lack of socialization among resource-poor entrepreneurs in other areas of research. 
Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) report cases of survival clusters in Latin America, 
often located in the shanty towns of large capital cities or in isolated rural areas. These 
clusters are described as inhabited by people who are self-employed or employed in informal 
workshops, and who suffer from severe resource-constraints: “most of these persons do not 
have substantial savings at their disposal…they typically do not master modern 
management techniques and lack the ability to organize and continuously improve 
production in a systematic way” (Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999, p. 1696). In such 
environments, they note, “the culture of imitation makes entrepreneurs reluctant to share 
any kind of information; opportunistic or even predatory behaviour may pay off, because 
many firm owners perceive their business as a survival activity to sustain them until a better 
opportunity arises.” (Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999, p. 1697). This view is reflected in 
other studies, which show that when firms have very few resources their socialization 
patterns diminish significantly (Visser, 1999). 
In this paper, we suggest that there is a threshold effect based on firms’ knowledge base 
which conditions the formation of new knowledge linkages. It is argued that firms with 
weak knowledge bases are unlikely to increase their knowledge linkages over time. To 
support this, it is suggested that  firms with very weak knowledge bases have modest 
knowledge resources to draw on and are unlikely therefore to be sought out for their 
knowledge by other cluster firms (Giuliani and Bell, 2005). It is suggested also that these 
firms may lack the internal capacity to absorb the stock of knowledge available in other 
cluster firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This leads to the last hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 6 (HP 6): In regional clusters, the poorer the firm’s knowledge base the 





4.1 Data  
This study is based on firm level data collected in the CV cluster at two points in time: 2002 
and 2006. Prior to the main fieldwork, exploratory interviews were conducted to obtain in 
depth knowledge on the wine industry in Chile and its contextual and historical 
background. Some 50 interviews were conducted with agronomists and oenologists from 
several Chilean firms (other than those in Valle de Colchagua) and other experts, including 
several representatives of the main Chilean business associations and consortia. The 
questionnaire was tested in pilot interviews with agronomists and oenologists also working 
in firms outside the CV cluster. The main fieldwork interviews followed the same procedure. 
All interviews in both periods were based on an almost identical structured questionnaire, 
were face-to-face and conducted in August-September in both years.6 The wineries survey 
did not include suppliers or clients – mainly because with the exception of grape growers 
these actors are located outside the cluster boundaries. Interviewees were skilled workers 
(i.e. oenologists, agronomists) in charge of the production process at firm level; interviews 
lasted 90 minutes on average. The surveys in both years covered the whole population (32 
firms) of fine wine producers in the cluster.  
Table 1 shows how the characteristics of firms have changed over the four years – reflecting 
cluster development. Their increased size is particularly striking: in 2006 nearly half (48%) 
employed more than 100 people, compared to only 6 per cent in 2002. In 2006 the 
proportion of firms with fewer than 20 employees was less than 10%, the average size of 
firms having doubled from 55 to 110 in the period. The number of firms established since 
2000 has increased from six to ten: two exited before 2006, and six new entrants joined the 
cluster. This pattern reflects a broader pattern of entry and exit in the cluster, with six 
firms exiting and six entering.7 The proportion of foreign owned firms increased by about 
one-third by 2006. This is not a direct result of entry and exit: all new entrants were 
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domestic firms that established new businesses, and one of the six exiting firms was foreign 
owned. The increased foreign ownership is the result of acquisitions of incumbent 
businesses by foreign owned firms and the involvement of one domestic incumbent in a joint 
venture partnership with a foreign owned firm. 
[Table 1 about here] 
In addition to the general firm-level variables presented in Table 1, the questionnaire was 
designed to collect other information relevant to this study: (i) about within-cluster inter-
firm knowledge linkages; (ii) firms’ knowledge bases. Relational data for (i) were collected 
using the roster recall method (Wasserman and Faust, 1994): firms were given a list (roster) 
of the other wine producing firms in the cluster and asked about innovation-related 
knowledge transfer. Q1 and Q2 (reported below) were directed to the agronomists and 
enologists employed by the wineries and focus on problem solving and technical assistance 
and efforts to improve or change the firm’s economic activity. Knowledge transfer is usually 
in the form of a response to a query about a problem:  
 Q1: Technical support received [inbound]  
 If you are in a critical situation and need technical advice, to which of the local firms 
mentioned in the roster do you turn? [Please indicate the importance you attach to the 
information obtained in each case by marking the identified firms on the following scale: 
0= none; 1= low; 2= medium; 3= high]. 
 Q2: Transfer of technical knowledge [outbound] 
 Which of the following firms do you think have benefited from technical support 
provided from this firm? [Please indicate the importance you attach to the information 
provided to each of the firms according to the following scale: 0= none; 1= low; 2= 
medium; 3= high]. 
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Since the data were collected in two waves (2002 and 2006), the relational data are 
expressed in two matrices composed of 32 rows and 32 columns, corresponding to the 
number of firms in the cluster in each year. The cells in the matrix show 1 for the existence 
of a tie between firm i in the row to firm j in the column and 0 otherwise.8 The matrix is 
asymmetric given that, as with any advice network, the transfer of knowledge from  firm i 
to firm j may not be bi-directional.  
A composite indicator with three dimensions was used to measure firms’ knowledge bases: 
(a) human resources’ formal training; (b) human resources’ experience in the field; and (c) 
firm experimentation intensity (see below). While (a) and (b) refer to the human resources 
at the time of interview (2002 and 2006), (c) takes account of experimentation up to two 
years prior to the interviews (the pilot fieldwork showed that a 2 year time span was 
sufficient to indicate the intensity of firms’ experimentation activity). None of the variables 
is influenced by local network ties, thus can be considered to capture characteristics that are 
exogenous to the knowledge network. The variables were defined as follows:   
(a) Human resources’ formal training: represents the cognitive backgrounds of the firm’s 
knowledge/skilled workers measured by level of education. In line with previous work on 
the returns to education, it is assumed that the higher the education degree, the greater will 
be the contribution to the firm’s knowledge and innovation activity. Each 
knowledge/skilled worker is weighted according to the education degree awarded:  
Human Resource = 0.8* Degree + 0.05* Master + 0.15* Doctorate      
A 0.8 weighting is applied for the number of graduate employees and highly specialized 
workers in the firm. This weight is increased by 0.05 times for number of employees with a 
masters degree and 0.15 for number of employees with a PhD degree.9 Only degrees and 
higher level specialization in technical and scientific fields related to wine production (i.e. 
agronomics, chemistry, etc.) are considered.  
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(b) Human resources’ experience: is the months of work experience of the qualified human 
resources. Number of months is indicative of the accumulation of knowledge via ‘learning 
by doing’. The variable is the result of a weighted mean of months of work of each 
knowledge skilled worker in Chile and abroad:   
Months of Experience in the Sector= 0.4* n° months (national)+ 0.6* n° months (international)
  
A higher weight is given to time abroad because the diversity of the professional 
environment might stimulate active learning behaviour and a steeper learning curve. 
Again, only learning experience related to wine industry activity is considered.  
(c) Experimentation intensity is a proxy for knowledge creation efforts. In the wine industry 
context indicators such as R&D expenditure and number of patents are neither available 
nor meaningful. Therefore this concept is operationalized on the basis of the specificities of 
the context. Based on lengthy consultation with industry experts, it was decided to capture 
experimentation intensity in terms of the number of production phases in which 
experimentation was carried out, i.e. experimentation related to the introduction of 
different clones or varieties to the vineyard terroir, management of irrigation and vine 
training systems, fermentation techniques and enzyme and yeast analysis, and analysis of 
the ageing period. Experimentation intensity was measured on a 0-4 scale (firms with no 
in-house experimentation score 0).  
Although these variables measure different aspects of the knowledge base, they are highly 
correlated - especially Human Resource and Months of Experience in the Sector (> 0.7) – 
making construction of a composite indicator for firm’s knowledge base (KB) appropriate. 
The composite indicator was extracted using Principal Component Analysis. A single 
factor was extracted representing more than 70% of data variation, and referred to as firm 
KB.10 This measure ranges from -1.278 to 2.050 in 2002 and from -1.873 to 1.152 in 2006.11  
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4.2 Analysis  
The analysis is undertaken in two steps. First, a static comparative analysis of network 
structure in the two periods considered (2002 and 2006), based on the set of network 
structure indicators presented in  Table 2(a). Second, the research hypotheses are tested on 
the basis of the stochastic actor-based model developed in Snijders (2001, 2005) and 
implemented using SIENA (Snijders et al., 2007). The model assumes that the changing 
network can be interpreted as the outcome of a Markov process and that actors control their 
outgoing ties. The idea is that when actor i decides to make a change to her/his outgoing tie 
variables (xi1, ….., xig), this will depend on a series of effects related to with actor’s network 
position and her/his individual characteristics and those of the other actors in the network. 
An actor selects the change that provides the greatest increase in the objective function, 
which represents the preference distribution of the actor over the set x of all possible 
networks. This function depends on unknown parameters that are estimated from the data. 
The objective function is represented as a weighted sum depending on a parameter β= (β1, …, 
βL) and fi (β, x) = ∑ βksik(x).  
x is the network at time t, and the functions sik(x) represent different types of effects that 
may influence network change over time and which are included in the model in line with 
the conceptual framework and research hypotheses. This paper considers a total of six 
effects: reciprocity and transitive closure (cohesion effects); out-degree popularity and 
assortativity (status effects); similarity effect and ego-activity (capability effects). A summary 
of the effects and guidance on how to interpret the results is presented in Table 2(b).  
SIENA estimates the model based on a method of moment, implemented as a continuous-
time Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation. To approximate the solution of the moment 
equation the stochastic approximation proceeds in three steps. First, a covariance matrix is 
calculated to estimate the algorithm. Second, a choice process simulation based on starting 
values, compares the resulting simulated network with the observed second period of the 
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network and adjusts the values to reduce the differences between the simulated and 
observed data. Third, simulations are used to determine the frequency distribution of the 
errors in predictions, which are used to calculate the standard errors for the final parameter 
values. The simulations were repeated several hundreds of times.  
[Table 2 here] 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Network characteristics and changes over time  
 
This section presents the results of the static comparative analysis of the knowledge 
networks in CV, in 2002 and 2006. Table 3 presents the key structural indicators and shows 
that the overall density of the network has increased greatly, from 0.0938 in 2002 to 0.2301 
in 2006. This large increase in the total number of links in the network could be interpreted 
as increased inclusion of cluster firms in the knowledge network, reflecting a more 
egalitarian diffusion of knowledge among cluster firms. The comparative values of other 
cohesiveness indicators reflect this: average distance has decreased by some 40 percent 
(from 2.155 in 2002 to 1.756), and fragmentation has halved (from 0.442 to 0.238), 
indicating a significant decrease in the number of disconnected firms in the network. 
Increased cohesiveness is reflected also in mutual ties, which account for 75 percent of total 
ties in the 2006 network, nearly double the 2002 value (43%). Also, the share of isolated 
firms on total cluster firms slightly diminished from 19 percent in 2002 to 13 percent in 
2006.  
Despite the increased density and reciprocation, the distribution of knowledge linkages has 
not varied over time. The GINI coefficient of degree centrality, which measures the degree 
of concentration of knowledge ties in the network, is the same (0.45) over the period, 
suggesting that the network’s structural features have not varied significantly over time.  
[Table 3 here] 
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To explore this further, the structural forms of the cluster network in 2006 and 2002 are 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2 and compared in Table 4, which shows that in 2002 the network 
has a core-periphery structure12 which is even more marked in 2006 (final fit, indicating the 
extent to which the network matches a pure core-periphery structure, increased from 0.433 
in 2002 to 0.861 in 2006). Also, the density of core-to-core relations increased (from 0.341 
in 2002 to 0.864 in 2006), while peripheral firms persist in being poorly connected to the 
core and especially to other peripheral firms (periphery-to-periphery density is 0.032 in 
2002 and 0.045 in 2006). Thus, the structural features that were present in 2002 –cohesive 
core and a loose periphery - persist over time. More important, the data show that over time 
60 percent of the firms that were peripheral in 2002 were still peripheral in 2006 and 30 per 
cent had exited the cluster and the industry. Only 10 percent of peripheral firms had joined 
the core by 2006. Similarly, the majority of 2002 core firms maintained that position 
through time. This explains why, despite increased network density, network linkages 
continued to be distributed in the same uneven way. In summary, over time network density 





5.2 Micro-level mechanisms of network dynamics 
 
What are the micro-level mechanisms responsible for the (lack of) network dynamism 
observed in CV? This section reports the empirical results of the actor-oriented network 
model estimations based on the SIENA analysis and tests the research hypotheses. Table 5 
reports the estimation results. The rate parameter and density effects are reported by 
default in this type of estimation. The rate parameter is positive and significant in all models 
indicating a significant change in the formation of new ties; the negative and significant 
 27 
coefficient of density indicates that firms tend to differentiate among firms when 
establishing knowledge linkages in the cluster (Snijders et al., 2007).  
Model 1 tests Hypotheses 1 and 2 about the importance of reciprocity and transitive closure for 
the formation of new ties. As expected, reciprocity is a very strong and significant driver of 
the formation of new knowledge ties (β=2.832 and s.e. 0.5184), which provides strong 
support for Hypothesis 1. The network shows a tendency for transitive closure, although 
this effect is not as strong as the reciprocity effect, evidenced by the smaller coefficient size 
(β=0.3994 and s.e. 0.0780).13 This result supports Hypothesis 2 that there is an endogenous 
cohesion effect which increases the overall density of the knowledge network.  
Model 2 includes the status effects of preferential attachment and assortativity, neither of 
which are significant.14 In Model 2 the β coefficient for out-degree popularity effect, which 
measures the existence of a preferential attachment phenomenon, is positive but small and 
not significant (β=0.0577 and s.e. 0.0564), which does not support Hypothesis 3. Likewise, 
similar status (assortativity) does not increase the likelihood that two actors will form a new 
knowledge tie. Rather, the estimation results suggest the opposite (β = - 0.0201 and s.e. is 
0.0846); however the lack of significance does not enable further hypothesizing about this 
result. Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  
Model 3 tests the role of capability effects in the formation of new knowledge ties. Because 
parsimony is very important in this type of model, status effects, which were not significant 
in Model 2, were dropped. The model includes a control for firm size (number of employees) 
and for firm nationality, because the the formation of new ties may be also influenced by 
these firm-level characteristics. A knowledge base similarity effect is used to test Hypothesis 
5. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient is positive but barely significant (β=0.7503 and 
s.e. 0.4046), which does not provide full support to Hypothesis 5. This result is commented 
on later in the paper. The β coefficient for the threshold effect is negative and significant (β=-
0.4225 and s.e. 0.1642), suggesting that firms with less solid knowledge bases are less likely 
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over time to form new knowledge linkages, which supports Hypothesis 6. Also, the β 
coefficient for threshold effects is almost as double the value observed for transitivity, which 
indicates that the latter exerts a comparatively weaker effect on the formation of new 
knowledge ties.  
Table 6 shows that in both 2002 and 2006,  isolated or peripheral firms in the knowledge 
network, tend to have lower level knowledge bases on average than other firms in the 
cluster. This is evidence that firms with particularly weak knowledge bases are only poorly 
connected to the cluster knowledge network and, more importantly, that firms with weak 
knowledge bases do not form linkages with similar alters, demonstrated by the low density 
of intra-periphery ties (see Table 4). This result explains the weak support for Hypothesis 5: 
while it is plausible that similarity matters when firms’ knowledge bases are above a certain 
threshold, firms with similarly-weak knowledge bases do not establish linkages with each 






The results of the empirical analysis are interesting for several reasons. The structural 
configuration of the knowledge network does not change significantly over time. Despite 
increased density and increased number of ties, the core-periphery structure present in 2002 
is consolidated in 2006, with peripheral firms persistence over time. This result is not 
surprising per se in the context of previous studies on other contexts than regional clusters, 
which show that networks are stable (e.g. Walker et al., 1997; Uzzi et al., 2002). However, 
most of the existing work is on the social structures that characterize mature systems, 
which “typically display a set of stable, self-reproducing positions occupied by actors with 
similar network profiles”(Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999, p. 1450). The context here is one of a 
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dynamically growing cluster, trying to catch up and compete in the international market, 
where one would expect much more variation, and especially towards a more egalitarian 
network structure. As Pyke et al. (1990: p. 1) state clusters can be places “exhibiting a 
remarkable resilience and even growth.” In our case, we observe persistence of an informal 
hierarchy between the core and peripheral firms.  
To explore how this result has been achieved we need to look at the results of the SIENA 
analysis about the micro-level drivers of new tie formation. First it shows that cohesion 
effects are important because reciprocity and transitive closure are key drivers of the formation 
of many new knowledge ties. This evidence is consistent with narratives of regional clusters 
that describe them as places where networks are dense and cohesive, and with much of the 
organizational sociology literature on inter-organizational networks (Pyke et al., 1990; 
Saxenian, 1994; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Qualitative insights from the survey interviews 
confirm that reciprocity is beneficial in stabilizing relationships over time, which helps to 
make interactions more fluid and spontaneous. In terms of the benefits from transitive 
closure, an enologist suggested in interview that “three is an ideal number to solve a problem: 
you have three brains to count on, who interact and share different expertises, and you reach a 
solution quickly. Discussions with more than three people are also fruitful but they are often lengthy 
and less effective.” Interviewees also confirmed that geographic proximity acts as a significant 
trigger for triadic closure: “there are many occasions within clusters in which professionals with 
whom I have a tie meet each other and start interacting.”  
However, this does not fully explain network dynamics: it is only part of the story and 
possibly the least interesting part. Cohesion effects can be assumed to be responsible for the 
increased density of linkages among core firms. However, while cohesion effects reinforce 
the core, the threshold effect keeps firms with weak knowledge bases at the periphery of the 
cluster knowledge network. In CV, firms characterized by weak knowledge bases are 
untouched by local socialization dynamics and not affected by the strength of the cohesion 
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effects in the cluster. This can be interpreted by referring to Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) 
idea of absorptive capacity. Cohen and Levinthal contend that the capacity of firms to form 
linkages with external actors depends on their knowledge bases, since the ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new, external information, to assimilate it, and apply it for 
commercial ends, requires prior accumulated knowledge (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). Hence, 
firms with very weak knowledge bases are unlikely to be able to scan and use external 
knowledge and because their knowledge resources are modest, they will be unlikely to be 
sought out to contribute knowledge to other cluster firms.  
Studies focusing on advanced economies often overlook the role played by the weakest firms 
in maintaining the structural properties of networks unaltered over time. This is because 
the unit of analysis in many such studies is resource-rich firms or individuals (e.g. inventors 
or innovative firms). Including these actors in studies of network dynamics provides an 
alternative and new interpretation of hierarchical structure formation, which in the 
literature is associated predominantly with status and prominence (e.g. Gould, 2002).  
In the present study, hierarchy is associated with the heterogeneity of firm knowledge bases 
rather than to status differences. In light of this result, we need to examine the possible 
reasons for the lack of status effect and its implications for network dynamics. One 
explanation might be that, within regional clusters, uncertainty about firm quality is 
mitigated by firms operating in the same environment which makes it more likely that 
information can be gleaned first hand and there is no need to rely on status when deciding 
about links (Pouder and St John, 1996). However, the interviewees had a different 
interpretation. One described it as “not all of us have access to such information not because it is 
secret, but because to be able to understand the real quality of something or someone you need to have 
some accumulated experience on that particular quality aspect.” On this basis, there might be firms 
that will be bound to rely on status rather than effective qualities, especially in resource-
poor contexts. Although counterintuitive, this would explain the finding of lack of status 
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effects: firms that are better able to access and scan information firsthand, by definition, do 
not rely on status while those firms that might rely on status to orient themselves, i.e. firms 
with fewer resources and weak knowledge bases, do not form linkages, as shown by the 
threshold effect.  
As a result of concurrent cohesion and threshold effects, the knowledge network in CV is 
structured spontaneously in a way that is functional to its success. In particular, while no 
leading hub firms emerge, there is a core of elite firms, which account for about a third of 
the cluster, which becomes consolidated. This network structure is effective for two 
important reasons. First, it is not vulnerable to the behavior of a few leading firms, which 
means that the network is not likely to be disrupted by, for instance, the decision of a hub 
firm to relocate or exit the industry; second, its core-periphery structure enables the 
circulation of high quality, tacit and fine-grained knowledge among the densely connected 
core firms, whose potential to upgrade knowledge is higher, and whose strong knowledge 
bases facilitate knowledge transfer. At the same time, the persistence of a core-periphery 
structure minimizes the risk that transferred knowledge becomes ‘downgraded’ by firms 
with weaker knowledge bases, as such firms are persistently relegated to marginal network 
positions. This spontaneous emergence and consolidation of a network structure is 
interesting. Also interesting is our observation for CV that firms achieve a macro-structural 
knowledge network configuration, where benefits are collective and go beyond those that 
might be achieved from the micro-level interactive choices of individual firms.  
This research contributes to literature in three ways. First, it contributes to the growing 
field of studies of geography, networks, and performance (Bell, 2005; Gittleman, 2007; 
Tallman and Phene, 2007; Bell and Zaheer, 2007; Mesquita and Lazzarini, 2008; 
Whittington et al., 2009). While there is a certain consensus that local network 
embeddedness plays a role in firm-level innovation success and competitiveness, little is 
known about how network embeddedness is created or enforced over time. This paper 
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represents a step forward by showing the importance of cohesion effects, but also that 
heterogeneity of firms’ characteristics may have a greater influence even than endogenous 
network effects, in shaping the evolution of a network over time. There are two lessons 
from this study. First, the geographic proximity of firms in a regional cluster may act as a 
significant push for increased network cohesion over time, but only if firms have internal 
resources above a certain minimum threshold. Second, resource poor firms have no internal 
push for or interest in forging new linkages and therefore do not contribute to local 
network dynamics despite their geographical proximity. In clusters where most firms are 
resource-poor it is unlikely that geographic or social endogenous forces will trigger more 
inclusive participation in knowledge-rich networks. This explains why resource-poor 
regions never become the leaders in international competition despite policy initiatives 
designed to strengthen local linkages.15 These results should inform scholars interested in 
cluster competitiveness in developing/emerging countries and those interested in backward 
regions in the advanced world.   
The paper also has implications for the literature on corporate behavior in emerging 
countries (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009), which assumes that 
emerging/developing economies suffer from severe market failures and institutional 
weaknesses. In this context, firms that want to enter the international competition need to 
cultivate and join different types of inter-organizational networks e.g. business groups or 
interpersonal networks, such as the guanxi in China. These networks provide access to 
resources, reduce information asymmetries among firms, enable higher bargaining power 
vis a vis other market counterparts, increase lobby power towards governments, and allow 
firms to upgrade their capabilities (Guillén, 2000; Peng and Lou, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 
2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Hitt et al., 2000; Chang et al., 2006; Stark and Vedres, 
2006; Acquaah, 2007; Mesquita and Lazzarini, 2008). They act as safety nets against 
uncertainty and unfavorable business climates. This paper makes a contribution by showing 
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that firms may be incapable of becoming members of the relevant networks. Despite the 
growing power of emerging economies in the current global competitive scenario, there are 
huge parts of these economies where backwardness and isolation prevail. The extent to 
which isolated or marginal firms will be able to connect to valuable networks and close the 
gap with the most powerful and successful firms in their own countries will affect the 
competitiveness of these emerging countries with the advanced economies. This study 
shows that even firms that could become easily part of the local network, thanks to the 
presence of cohesion effects, face a divide that exists and persists over time. Understanding 
how this divide can be reduced is a challenge for research on the future competitiveness of 
emerging and developing economies.  
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on inter-organizational network dynamics. 
One of the challenges in this area is to disentangle the relative impact of endogenous and 
exogenous micro-level behavior on macro-level network dynamics. While there is a 
significant body of research focusing on endogenous network effects (e.g. Walker et al., 
1997; Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008), little attention has been paid to the individual actors 
and their characteristics  (Stuart, 1998; Powell et al., 2005; Fleming and Frenken, 2007). 
Owen-Smith and Powell (2004, p. 5) point out that in network research “limited attention 
has been paid thus far on how important non-structural features – such as the 
characteristics of the organizations that represent nodes in the network … - alter the 
character of information flows.” This paper adds to this line of research. Also, while most 
existing research is anchored in secondary data and formal linkages (e.g. alliances, co-
patenting activity, formal R&D arrangements), this paper offers some insights on the 
dynamics of informal networks.  
The analysis in this paper has some important limitations, which provide opportunities for 
further research but also suggest some caution in how the findings are interpreted. First, it 
is based on a single case study, which limits the extent to which the results can be 
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generalized. However, the research design in this study can be replicated and it would be 
interesting to see similar research on other sectors in the developing world. Second, it 
focuses on only one type of local network: the knowledge network. This choice has been 
based on exploratory research involving hundreds interviews with industry experts and 
representatives worldwide, which suggested that an inter-organizational knowledge 
network based on technical advice seeking/giving would be the most meaningful in terms of 
problem solving and innovative outputs. However, other studies could look at other types of 
networks. Third, it focuses on local ties but does not take account of external linkages. 
Firms in the CV cluster have connections with national and international actors; however, 
this study does not explore whether firms’ structural equivalence within a network that 
includes external actors, influences the ties within the cluster, which would be an 
interesting direction for future research. Fourth, the data on the existence of relationships 
are binary, and do not include information on their value or strength. The choice to use 
binary data was because they are the only type of data SIENA handles and because 
dichotomizing for higher values of the valued relationships (i.e. higher than or equal to 2) 
would have resulted in a significant loss of ties. Given the fact that this is a small case study 
this seemed not appropriate. Fifth, the paper does not account for the impact of entry/exit 
patterns, the interest being focused on incumbent firms. However, the firms that exited the 
industry in 2006 were those with the weakest knowledge bases in 2002, showing that exit is 
more likely than network inclusion. Lastly, this research tracks only a snapshot of the 
cluster growth period (2002-2006); studies on network dynamics that rely on secondary 
data typically are able to cover longer periods. However, it should be acknowledged that 
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Table 1 Firm characteristics in the two survey years 
   2002 Entry/Exit 2006 
Characteristics of firms  (N= 32) 2002 - 2006 (N= 32) 
(a) Size (number of employees)     
 Small (1-19) (%) 28  9 
 Medium (20-99) (%) 66  43 
 Large (≥100) (%) 6  48 
 Average Number of Employees per firm  
(number)  
55.5  110.5 
(b) Year of establishment     
 Up to 1970s (number)  6 -1 5 
 During the 1980s (number)  8 -1 7 
 During the 1990s (number)  12 -2 10 
 During the 2000s (number)  6 -2  + 6 10 
(c) Firm entry and exit: 2002 - 2006     
 Exit – Number of firms (number)               6   (5 domestic) 
      
 Entry  - Number of firms (number)               6  (All domestic) 
      
(c) Ownership     
 Domestic  (%) 81  66 














Table 2 Summary of key measures for the analysis of the knowledge network 
 
2 (a)  Measures for comparative static analysis of networks  
Density Network density (ND) is defined as the proportion of possible linkages present in a graph. ND is 
calculated as the ratio of the number of linkages present, L, to its theoretical maximum, g(g-1)/2, 
where g is the number of nodes in the network:  ND = L / [g(g-1)/2]. ND value range from a 




pairs)     
 
The average of geodesic distances between nodes in the network. The distance is the length of a 
geodesic between them, which is measured as the shortest path.  
Fragmentation Proportion of nodes that cannot reach each other.  
 
Mutual linkages on 
total linkages (%) 
 
Percentage of reciprocated ties on total ties in the network. 
Share of Isolates Percentage of firms with no connections to other firms in the cluster. 
 
GINI Coefficient 
for firms’ degree 
centrality   
Distribution of knowledge linkages measured by the GINI coefficient applied to degree centrality 
(DC). DC is number of knowledge linkages established by a firm with other firms in the cluster, 
irrespective of the direction of the linkage.  
  
2(b) Measure and effects for SIENA Analysis 
Cohesion effects:  
Reciprocity A positive and significant β coefficient means that reciprocation is the means chosen by an actor 
to maximize its objective function through the formation of new knowledge ties. 
 
Transitive triplets A positive and significant β coefficient means that new ties are formed by closing triads of firms 
where two connections existed in the previous period. 
Status effects:    
Preferential 
attachment 
This is tested through the out-degree popularity effect. A positive and significant β coefficient 
effect reflects the tendencies for actors with high out-degrees (i.e. outgoing knowledge ties) to 
attract extra incoming ties in the subsequent period. 
 
Assortativity This is tested through the out-out assortativity effect. This effect tests for the existence of actor 
preference to form new ties with actors with similar out-going ties. A positive and significant β 
coefficient means that firms that provide more technical advice to others at time 1 tend to form 
linkage among themselves in the subsequent period. 
Capability effects:   
Similarity 
 
A positive and significant β coefficient means that ties tend to occur more often between firms 
with similar values in their knowledge base (KB).  
 
Threshold  To carry out this test, the variable KB was transformed into Inv-KBi= (Max KB –KBi). This 
inverts the vector of KB values so that firms with the weakest knowledge bases have the highest 
scores in this indicator and vice versa. The effect applied in SIENA is Inv-KB actor activity. A 
significant and negative β coefficient suggests that the weaker the firm’s knowledge base the 
lower the probability that the firm will form new knowledge ties, indicating the presence of a 
threshold effect.   
 
 
Table 3 Changes in the knowledge network: descriptive comparative data 
Indicators:  2002 2006 
Density 0.0938 0.2301 
Average distance (among reachable pairs)     2.155 1.756 
Fragmentation  0.442 0.238 
Mutual linkages on total linkages (%) 43% 75% 
Isolates on total firms (%) 19% 13% 




Table 4 Core-periphery structures in 2002 and 2006 
2002 The Density of Linkages* 
(Knowledge transfer from row to column) 
Final Fit 
 Core Periphery  
Core (nC=12) 0.341 0.096 
Periphery (nP=20) 0.054 0.032 
0.433 
2006 Core Periphery 
Core (nC=12) 0.864 0.230 
Periphery (nP=20) 0.206 0.045 
 
0.861 




Table 5 Results of SIENA Analysis 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 











14,0709   
(2,2233) 
Density -2.4199   
(0.3060) 
 
-2.5463   
(0.5995) 





2.8322   
( 0.6136) 
























  -0,4156   
(0,1782) 
Size of ego (control)   0.0003  
 (0.0010) 
Nationality of ego (control)   -0,0820   
(0,3198) 
 
Note: Results of stochastic approximation. Estimated parameter based on 987 iterations. The convergence of 
the models was good in all cases (t-ratios were all inferior to 0.10 for all coefficients in all models) and no 





Table 6 Exploring the threshold-effect of knowledge base in 2002 and 2006 




(a) Isolated firms    
Isolates -0.88 -1.22 
Rest of the firms  0.58 0.31 
ANOVA test (p-value)  0.000 0.001 
(b) Peripheral firms    
Periphery  -0.45 -0.40 
Core 0.58 0.59 





                                                 
1 There is an extensive literature on industrial clusters of developing countries (one of the pioneering studies 
being Schmitz, 1995). However, these works do not specifically focus on knowledge networks and look at how 
clusters and inter-firm cooperation impact on economic development.  
2 The available data indicate that, within the cluster, the number of hectares of vines planted for wine 
production almost tripled from 1997 to 2002 (www.sag.gob.cl).  
3 CORFO is Corporacion de Fomento, a Chilean government institution that promotes industry development.  
4 E.g., the number of times Colchagua’s wines have been cited annually by Wine Spectator increased 10-fold in 
the period 1994-2002.  
5 This does not mean that prominence is established in a vacuum and it is totally independent on the real and 
observable qualities of an actor. However, as suggested by Gould (2002: 1146) “socially influenced judgments 
amplify underlying differences, so that actors who objectively rank above the mean on some abstract quality 
dimension are overvalued while those ranking below the mean are undervalued.”  
6  The 2006 questionnaire included some slight modifications which did not affect the key variables used in 
this paper.  
7 Note that entry and exit of 6 firms does not mean that the exiting firms were taken over by the new entrants. 
It is coincidental that over the period studied there was perfect turnover, thus the overall population of the 
firms in the cluster did not change, resulting in 32 operating firms in both observed periods.  
8 Only dichotomous data are used for the purpose of this paper. SIENA analysis does not process valued data.  
9 The weights are defined ad hoc. The indicator was calculated using other weights without significant 
differences for the analysis.  
10 Factor loadings and uniqueness are available upon request. 
11 To cross-check the validity of this measure, the questionnaire has a section on qualitative descriptions of the 
type of production methods and experimentation activities carried out by each firm (objectives, length, 
methods of analysis, etc.) This information was used to check for a correspondence between the quantitative 
KB indicator and the knowledge base of the CV firms as reflected by more qualitative insights. Two experts 
were consulted (an academic and a consultant) to give an external assessment of the strength of the knowledge 
base of each firm in the cluster on the basis of the qualitative information collected. Cross-checks were 
generally confirmatory of the usefulness of the KB indicator to capture the strength of firms’ knowledge bases. 
12 Core/Periphery Models are based on the notion of a two-class partition of nodes, namely, a cohesive sub-
graph (the core) in which nodes are connected to each other in some maximal sense and a class of nodes which 
are more loosely connected to the cohesive subgroup but lack any maximal cohesion with the core. The 
analysis sets the density of the core to periphery ties in an ideal structure matrix. The density represents the 
number of ties within the group on total ties possible (Borgatti and Everett, 1999). 
13 Alternative measures of transitivity and network closure were used to test this hypothesis (transitive ties; 
balance effect; three-cycle effects), all gave significant results but the transitive triplet effect was strongest.  
14 The model was also tested considering the two measures separately. 
15 Based on the author’s direct knowledge of cluster policies and cluster policy evaluations.  
